Background Empirical studies of surrogate decision-making tend to assume that surrogates should make only a 'substituted judgement'—that is, judge what the patient would want if they were mentally competent. Objectives To explore what people want in a surrogate decision-maker whom they themselves select and to test the assumption that people want their chosen surrogate to make only a substituted judgement. Methods 30 undergraduate students were recruited. They were presented with a hypothetical scenario about their expected loss of mental capacity in (...) the future and asked to answer some questions about their choice of surrogate. These data were analysed qualitatively using thematic content analysis. Results Most respondents talked about choosing someone who was caring and competent in certain ways, giving interesting evidence for their judgements. Surprisingly few highlighted how well they thought their chosen surrogate knew their preferences and would be able to make a substituted judgement. Moreover, few specified that their chosen surrogate had similar attitudes and values to their own and so would make a similar decision to theirs in the circumstances presented. Some respondents also referred to the social role of their chosen surrogate or the social dynamics of their situation which influenced their choices, as well as to ideas of reciprocity and characteristics of honesty and loyalty. Conclusion In the event that they lose mental capacity, many people will not select a surrogate to decide about medical treatments on their behalf solely on the basis that they expect their surrogate to make a substituted judgement. (shrink)

BackgroundConcerns about decision making related to resuscitation have led to two important challenges in the courts resulting in new legal precedents for decision-making practice. Systematic research investigating the experiences of doctors involved in decisions about resuscitation in light of the recent changes in law remains lacking.AimTo analyse the practice of resuscitation decision making on hospital wards from the perspectives of doctors.DesignThe data presented in this paper were collected as part of a wider research study of end-of-life care in an acute (...) hospital setting. Data collection comprised ethnographic non-participant observation on two acute hospital wards and individual interviews with patients, relatives and healthcare professionals caring for patients thought to be approaching the end of life. Data were analysed using a constructivist grounded theory approach.ResultsDiscussions and decision making about resuscitation present many challenges for those involved on acute medical wards. The data highlight the potential for multiple interpretations of legal precedents, creating misunderstandings that may impact patient care in less positive ways.ConclusionsThis paper provides unique insights into how doctors respond to the changing medico-legal culture and the subsequent effects on patient care. It demonstrates how the juridification of medical practice can occur. It highlights the potential benefit of a structure to support clinicians, patients and relatives in discussing and navigating decisions around care at the end of life in line with the patient’s wishes and preferences. Recommendations for future research are made and legal ramifications are discussed. (shrink)

Duties to future persons are central to numerous key ethical issues including contraception, abortion, genetic selection, treatment of the environment, and population control. Nevertheless, we still seem to be lacking Parfit's 'Theory X', a general theory of beneficence whose appropriateness extends to future generations. Starting from the Golden Rule, R. M. Hare purportedly derived counterintuitive duties to potential people and 'the potentiality principle'. However, I argue that Hare's derivation involves a hidden and unjustifiable extension from TGR, and show how the (...) most plausible form of TGR is compatible with multiple contradictory principles for the treatment of future persons. I appeal to our own preferences to argue that one extension of TGR follows the spirit of TGR, while the other is deeply implausible. Using the plausible extension, I derive a Contingent Interests Principle that offers much promise as Parfit's elusive Theory X. In contrast to Hare's interpretation of TGR, this application provides solid justification for rejecting the potentiality principle. (shrink)

. Prediction of crop yield is significant in order to accurately meet market requirements and proper administration of agricultural activities directed towards enhancement in yield. Several parameters such as weather, pests, biophysical and physio morphological features merit their consideration while determining the yield. However, these parameters are uncertain in their nature, thus making the determined amount of yield to be approximate. It is exactly here that the fuzzy logic comes into play. This paper elaborates an attempt to develop fuzzy inference (...) systems for crop yield prediction. Physio morphological features of Sorghum were considered. A huge database of physio morphological features such as days of 50 percent flowering, dead heart percentage, plant height, panicle length, panicle weight and number of primaries and the corresponding yield were considered for the development of the model. In order to find out the sensitivity of parameters, one-to-one, two-to-one and three-to-one combinations of input and output were considered. The results have clearly shown that panicle length contributes for the yield as the lone parameter with almost one-to-one matching between predicted yield and actual value while panicle length and panicle weight in combination seemed to play a decisive role in contributing for the yield with the prediction accuracy reflected by very low RMS value. (shrink)

Many contemporary logicians acknowledge a plurality of logical theories and accept that theory choice is in part motivated by logical evidence. However, just as there is no agreement on logical theories, there is also no consensus on what constitutes logical evidence. In this paper, I outline Jean Piaget’s psychological theory of reasoning and show how he used it to diagnose and solve one of the paradoxes of material implication. I assess Piaget’s use of psychology as a source of evidence for (...) logical theory in light of reservations raised by psychologism, and I highlight some ramifications for exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism about logic by considering his use of psychology as logical evidence in the framework of genetic epistemology, Piaget’s research programme. I conclude that Piaget’s psychological theory of reasoning not only plausibly serves as a source of evidence for logical theory but also makes a strong case for anti-exceptionalism about logic. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Science: Logic, Strategies, Methods” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: This article argues that we do not need a new scientific method or a “second-order science” to deal with the facts that the individual characteristics of observers may affect the nature and quality of their observations and that the application of scientific theories may affect the systems they describe. It also argues that Umpleby has not given us good reason to think that we do.